

Top Secret

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Watch Committee


Watch Report

DOS and DIA review(s) completed.

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27 November 1974

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COMBINED WATCH REPORT
of the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

No. 1266

27 November 1974
(As of 1800 EST)

The Committee concludes that there will be no military attack on the United States or its overseas forces in the near future. Subjects of immediate concern are discussed below.

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I. Middle East

Announcements that Syria is expected to agree to an extension of the UNDOF presence on the Golan front have slightly reduced the immediate threat of renewed hostilities. An overall air of uncertainty, wariness and suspicion remains, however, and the onus is now clearly on political and diplomatic efforts to produce tangible evidence of progress toward an eventual settlement. We believe that until the UNDOF mandate is, in fact, extended and there is a visible reduction in military preparedness, a resumption of fighting could occur with little or no warning.

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There does not appear to be any diminution in the fighting between government forces and Kurdish rebels along the Iraqi-Iranian border. With the continued presence of Iranian army elements on Iraqi territory in support of the Kurdish rebels, there is a risk of serious military confrontation between Baghdad and Tehran.

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II. USSR-Eastern Europe

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We see no indications of hostile intent in the military activity of the USSR or other Warsaw Pact nations.

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III. Southeast Asia

The Communists are planning a significant intensification of the level of fighting in South Vietnam during the first half of 1975. New COSVN instructions call for widespread and

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heavy attacks throughout much of South Vietnam in the "first days" of the campaign -- possibly as early as December -- in the hopes of achieving some quick and dramatic victories. Subsequent action is then to be concentrated in a few "vulnerable" areas. The intensification of military pressure called for in the COSVN instructions would probably result in limited reverses for the South Vietnamese government.

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